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Being intentionally harmful in original ways has been termed “malevolent creativity.” The
empirical study of malevolent creativity is still in its infancy, so developing a strong
foundation of its antecedents is paramount. Three factors were identified as potentially
influencing the generation of malevolently creative ideas: implicit aggression, which is
aggression that is beyond one’s conscious awareness; premeditation, a facet of
impulsivity that pertains to the degree of planning and forethought an individual engages
in before acting; and situations that condone or otherwise provoke the use of malevolent
creativity. Consistent with our hypotheses, and in accordance with the theory of trait
activation, a 3-way interaction among those factors was obtained. Specifically, the
interaction indicates that individuals who are more implicitly aggressive and less
premeditative are more likely to be malevolently creative in response to situations that
provoke malevolent creativity.
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provoking situation, trait activation

In academia and businesses alike, creativity is almost always assumed to be a
good thing. To be creative is to be expressive, productive, progressive, pushing the
boundaries, and thinking outside the box. However, a new and growing literature is
supporting the notion that creativity can have a “dark side” (Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman,
& Runco, 2010), and in particular can be used toward harmful ends (Cropley, Kaufman,
& Cropley, 2008; James, Clark, & Cropanzano, 1999). Those harmful ends range from
criminal activity (Cropley & Cropley, 2011, 2013; Eisenman, 2008) and terrorism (Gill,
Horgan, Hunter, & Cushenbery, 2013; Gill, Horgan, & Lovelace, 2011; Jackson &
Loidolt, 2013; Moghadam, 2013) to leadership influence tactics (Harris, Reiter-Palmon,
& Ligon, 2014) and various forms of deception (Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013;
De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mayer &
Mussweiler, 2011; Walczyk, Runco, Tripp, & Smith, 2008). Being intentionally harmful in
original ways has been termed “malevolent creativity” (Cropley et al., 2008), and
empirical investigation of the antecedents of malevolent creativity is limited. This study
attempts to build a strong foundation for the future study of malevolent creativity by

examining the degree to which situational and individual factors influence the generation
of malevolently creative ideas.
Malevolent Creativity
Suggesting that creativity can result in harmful outcomes is a rather recent
phenomenon (e.g., McLaren, 1993; James et al., 1999). James et al. (1999) coined the
term “negative creativity,” which is any instance in which a creative product
unintentionally leads to a harmful outcome. Cropley et al. (2008) further distilled the idea
of creativity leading to harmfulness by coining the term “malevolent creativity,” which is
when creativity is used to achieve a harmful goal. That distinction is important because
negative creativity pertains to harmfulness as a byproduct of creativity, whereas
malevolent creativity (MC) pertains to harmfulness as an intended goal of creativity.
Previous definitions of MC have focused on causing harm to other individuals or oneself
(Cropley et al., 2008; Harris, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2013), as well as property
(e.g., buildings) and processes (e.g., public transportation) (Cropley et al., 2008). In
discussing terrorist attacks, Horgan (2013) offered a typology of four target types:
people, property, processes, and symbols (e.g., churches, statues, leaders). That fourth
target type—symbol—is quite important because it suggests that the destruction of
certain targets can be more culturally devastating than others, such as destroying a
residential home versus destroying a village’s temple. As such, any formal definition of
MC should include the potential symbolic significance of a target. Plucker, Beghetto,
and Dow (2004) define creativity as “the interaction among aptitude, process, and
environment by which an individual or product that is both novel and useful as defined
within a social context” (p. 90), and for MC we add “wherein that perceptible product is
intended deliberately to cause harm to people, property, processes, or symbols.”
There are numerous subsets of malevolently creative behaviors, such as novel
instances of deception, bullying, sexual harassment, aggressive humor, theft, property
destruction, and counterproductive work behaviors. In other words, any instance of
malevolence can be viewed as malevolently creative as long as that behavior is also
novel in some way; a behavior that is only harmful, but not original, cannot be
considered to be malevolently creative. Harmfulness is the “usefulness” criterion in the
case of MC because being harmful is what makes something useful for someone who
intends to inflict harm (e.g., terrorists).
Due to its theoretical infancy, empirical studies of MC are scarce. To the best of
our knowledge, only three such studies are currently published. First, Clark and James
(1999) found that perceptions of unfair treatment enhanced instances of negative
creativity whereas perceptions of fair treatment yielded more positive creativity. These
results indicate that situational perceptions, such as justice and fairness, may influence
the degree to which creative products are negative. Second, Lee and Dow (2011) had
individuals generate creative uses for a brick and a pencil, and they found that MC was
positively related to trait physical aggression and negatively related to
conscientiousness. A gender effect was also found such that males were more

malevolently creative than females. The authors suggested that conscientiousness
negatively correlated with MC because people higher in conscientiousness are typically
more conforming, whereas those low in conscientiousness are more unconventional
and therefore might be more willing to consider and list harmful uses for a pencil or
brick. The gender difference was also not surprising because past research has shown
that males are typically more physically aggressive and violent than females.
It must be noted that the operationalizations of negative creativity and MC in
those two studies was questionable. First, Clark and James (1999) operationalized
negative creativity as the most creative idea generated in response to a negatively
valanced task (i.e., covertly providing defaming information about a competitor to a
potential client). Second, Lee and Dow (2011) operationalized MC as the number of
harmful ideas generated in response to a divergent-thinking task. The former
operationalization disregarded the harmfulness of the ideas generated whereas the
latter disregarded the uniqueness of the ideas generated. In an attempt to combine
those two components, Harris et al. (2013) operationalized MC as an idea that was both
negative and original, not just one or the other. Those authors found that emotional
intelligence negatively related to MC in response to problem-solving tasks and
divergent-thinking tasks, even when accounting for cognitive intelligence and task
effects. These results indicate that individuals with lower emotional intelligence are
more likely to respond to situations in malevolently creative ways, even in situations that
do not have explicit emotional or social cues.
Implicit Aggression
Because of its intentionally harmful nature, MC can in some ways be considered
“aggressive creativity.” Although Lee and Dow (2011) found that trait physical
aggression positively correlated with MC on a divergent-thinking task, their results are
open to many interpretations. It is possible that physically aggressive individuals (a) are
able to think of more harmful ways of using everyday objects, (b) are able to think more
about harmful solutions in general, (c) are more likely to write down their harmful ideas,
(d) have fewer inhibitions regarding the ideation or generation of harmful ideas, or (e) do
not view their ideas as aggressive. That last option is particularly fascinating because of
the implications that highly aggressive people may not view their behaviors as harmful,
but rather logical and appropriate.
People use justification mechanisms to allow themselves to view their behavioral
tendencies as rational and logical, thereby solidifying those tendencies as the preferred
ways in which they interpret and react to the world around them (James, 1998). The use
of different justification mechanisms is referred to as conditional reasoning, or
essentially differences between people regarding which behaviors they find justifiable in
certain contexts. Aggressive behaviors in particular might be difficult to rationalize as
appropriate for most situations, but implicitly aggressive individuals may justify their
aggressive behavior—which they likely do not view as aggressive—as being the most
logical course of action.

Some examples of justification mechanisms for aggression include the following:
an increased likelihood of seeing malevolent intent in others’ actions, even in good or
well-meaning actions; having unconscious desires to harm others; framing oneself as a
victim, and framing others in terms of weakness and strength (James, 1998; James &
LeBreton, 2010). Implicitly aggressive people are therefore more likely to interpret social
interactions differently than implicitly prosocial people. This is not to say that
nonaggressive individuals only rely on prosocial justification mechanisms and
aggressive individuals only rely on aggressive justification mechanisms. Instead, it is
likely the case that individuals who more strongly justify their aggressive acts have
stronger dispositions to be aggressive (James, 1998). However, justification
mechanisms are largely, if not entirely, unconscious (i.e., a mental phenomenon that is
latent and unintended, with processes that people are unaware of; LeBreton, Barksdale,
Robin, & James, 2007). Therefore, people are mostly unaware of the implicit (i.e.,
unconscious) prosocial or aggressive cognitions that drive their behavior.
Implicitly aggressive individuals are prone to viewing the world as a hostile place.
They often preoccupy themselves with building self-defenses from assumed threats,
perceiving others as strong or weak, dehumanizing the targets of their aggression, and
justifying their aggression as appropriate for most if not all situations (James, 1998).
Implicitly aggressive individuals frame their realities in hostile and competitive ways, so
they likely spend considerable time and effort thinking about different types of
aggressive behaviors, especially aggressive problem-solving tactics and strategies.
These individuals are essentially experts in thinking aggressively; they are quite adept
at thinking more flexibly when generating harmful ways of responding to certain
situations. That flexibility may enhance their ability to generate more original ways of
being harmful (i.e., being more malevolently creative). Thus, we propose our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more implicitly aggressive will generate
a higher number of malevolently creative ideas than individuals who are
less implicitly aggressive.
Premeditation
Aggressive individuals typically have lower levels of premeditation (Derefinko,
DeWall, Metze, Walsh, & Lynam, 2011; Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003), a
facet of impulsivity that refers to the degree of planning, forethought, and anticipation of
consequences an individual engages in before acting or making a decision (Whiteside &
Lynam, 2001). Impulsivity in general has been found to relate to dysfunctional and
distorted cognitions and workplace deviance (Henle, 2005; Mobini, Pearce, Grant, Mills,
& Yeomans, 2006), and in particular, lower premeditation is associated with a variety of
dysfunctional behaviors such as criminal behavior and alcohol-related problems (Jones
& Lynam, 2009; King, Karyadi, Luk, & Patock-Peckham, 2011; Lynam & Miller, 2004).
Individuals who are lower in premeditation do not strongly consider the consequences
of their actions and may be unable or unwilling to weigh the advantages and

disadvantages of a particular behavior before acting on it (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).
As such, those individuals may be more prone to being malevolent because they are
less likely to reflect on the possibility that their behavior may be unethical, inappropriate,
or harmful. That lack of reflection might enhance MC because those individuals are
seemingly not as constrained by the limitations that morality and norms place on certain
behaviors. Thus, we propose our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are less premeditative will generate a
higher number of malevolently creative ideas than individuals who are
more premeditative.
The Interaction Between Implicit Aggression, Premeditation, and Provoking
Situations
In a series of studies, De Dreu and Nijstad (2008) found that individuals with
conflict-related cognitions, or cognitions that are part of a conflict set such as hatred,
competition, or hostility, generated more competitive tactics, more competitive
categories, and more original competitive tactics than did individuals with cooperative
cognitions, especially in response to competitive situations. However, individuals with
conflict-related cognitions had decreased originality and flexibility when placed within a
cooperative context; people who endorse competitive strategies and tactics are more
likely to think originally and flexibly when in highly competitive situations because of a
congruence, or fit, between cognition and situation. As such, it also reasons that MC will
depend on an interaction between implicit aggression and situational cues such that MC
will be enhanced when individuals who are higher in implicit aggression respond to
situations that provoke MC. Conversely, MC will likely decrease when individuals who
are higher in implicit aggression respond to situations that provoke benevolent creativity
because of a mismatch between cognition and situational cues.
Those propositions reflect a broader theoretical model: the theory of trait
activation (Tett & Guterman, 2000). This theory delineates a trait-situation interaction
model of personality to the extent that different personality traits are activated to varying
degrees in response to different situations. In the case of the current investigation, trait
activation will likely manifest via a two-way interaction between implicit aggression and
situational cues. In other words, the aggressive cues of a situation that provokes MC will
activate an individual’s implicit aggression to influence MC, whereas the nonaggressive
cues of a situation that provokes benevolent creativity will not activate an individual’s
implicit aggression to influence MC.
Although aggressive individuals typically have lower levels of premeditation
(Derefinko et al., 2011; Joireman et al., 2003), they are less likely to be aggressive
when they strongly consider the future consequences of their actions, particularly when
those actions carry a future cost (Joireman et al., 2003). That consideration of future
consequences can be likened to a controlled processing of ethical decision-making
(Reynolds, 2006), whereas engaging in automatic ethical decision-making is often much

quicker and involves the use of rationalizing a course of action. As such, it reasons that
implicitly aggressive individuals (i.e., people who quickly rationalize aggressive courses
of action) will be more malevolently creative when they are also less premeditative,
indicating a two-way interaction between implicit aggression and premeditation on MC.
Arguably, malevolent actions are necessarily unethical. Along those lines, KishGephart, Harrison, and Treviño (2010) suggested that there is an “ethical impulse” with
regard to unethical decisions. Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) speculated that individuals
“default to a more automatic type of processing unless something in the situation
triggers more controlled processing” (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010, p. 22). Cropley and
Cropley (2013) likewise suggested that there is probably a difference between MC that
is impulsive and violent and MC that is more resourceful and planned (e.g., “white
collar” crimes). If aggressive situational cues activate implicit aggression to influence
MC, then in correspondence with the notion of ethical impulses, it reasons that the
amount of forethought and consideration an individual typically engages in may further
influence MC; higher levels of premeditation (a controlled process) may inhibit the
effects of implicit aggression (an automatic process) on MC, even in response to
situations that provoke MC. Although implicit aggression is likely activated in situations
that provoke MC, the tendency to consider the consequences of one’s actions may act
as a buffering, self-monitoring, or self-regulatory mechanism to reduce the effects of
implicit aggression on MC. With all of these possibilities considered, we propose a
three-way interaction in our third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A three-way interaction between implicit aggression,
premeditation, and situation is hypothesized. Implicitly aggressive
individuals will generate a higher number of malevolently creative ideas
when they are lower in premeditation. Responding to situations that
provoke MC (vs. situations that provoke benevolent creativity) will
strengthen (vs. weaken) that relationship.

Method
Procedure
This study was administered online through the Qualtrics survey system.
Participants first read an informed consent. They then either (1) completed a measure
of implicit aggression (the Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; CRTA) and
generated ideas in response to one of two problems (i.e., MC-provoking or benevolent
creativity (BC)-provoking), or they (2) generated ideas first and then completed the
CRTA; the order of administration between the CRTA and problem was
counterbalanced. Participants then completed a measure of premeditation, a divergentthinking task, and a demographic questionnaire.
Participants

The sample consisted of 138 students from a university in the Midwestern United
States, with 43 males (31%) and 93 females (67%). Participant ages ranged from 17 to
57 years (M = 24.79, SD = 7.73). Two participants did not indicate their gender or their
age. Sixty-nine participants responded to the MC-provoking problem and 69 responded
to the BC-provoking problem. Two participants who responded to the MC-provoking
problem, and five participants who responded to the BC-provoking problem, did not
follow instructions (i.e., they generated questions instead of actionable ideas), so their
data were not included in relevant analyses.
Stimulus Materials
Problem-solving task in a pilot study. Three problems were generated for
potential use in the primary study. Those problems were tested in a pilot study, which
consisted of 75 students from a university in the Midwestern United States, with 22
males (29%) and 53 females (71%). Participant ages ranged from 18 to 58 years (M =
21.95, SD = 5.98). Participants completed the study online via the Qualtrics survey
system. After reading a consent form, participants were asked to read one of three
randomly assigned problem vignettes. Participants then indicated their affective
responses to the problem they read by completing a measure of affect.
The three problems were framed with two parallel aspects: social interactions
with students who are class teammates and instructing that covert action be taken. The
former aspect was included to enhance contextual familiarity for participants, and the
latter aspect was included to promote the generation of original ideas (i.e., provoke a
certain type of creativity). The MC-provoking problem was tailored to include cues such
as overt hostility, anger, injustice, and retaliation. In contrast, the BC-provoking problem
was tailored to include cues such as cooperation, assistance, and intellectual struggling.
Refer to the Appendix for the three problems used in the pilot study.
Participants reported their affective responses to the problem they read by
completing the PANAS-X (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The subscales of negative
affect, hostility, and serenity were the most relevant to this study. Participants
responded to a variety of affective words using a Likert-type scale, 1(very slightly or not
at all) to 5 (extremely), to indicate the extent to which they felt that particular emotion
after reading one of the three problems. The subscale of negative affect (α = .90)
included items such as nervous, distressed, and upset. The subscale of hostility (α=
.79) included items such as angry, hostile, and irritable. Finally, the subscale of serenity
(α = .83) included items such as calm, relaxed, and at ease.
Table 1 shows the ANOVAs that were conducted between the three problems
with respect to negative affect, hostility, and serenity. T tests were also conducted just
between the MC-provoking and BC-provoking problems. Effect sizes for the three
ANOVAs and t tests are included in Table 1. Those results indicate that participants
who read the MC-provoking problem (vs. the BC-provoking problem) felt more hostile,
stronger negative affect, and less serene. Those two problems were therefore distinct

enough from one another to be included in the primary study. However, because the
neutral problem elicited affective responses that were inconsistently or not significantly
different from the other two problems, it was decided that the neutral problem would be
not be used in the primary study.
Problem-solving task in the primary study. In the primary study, participants
were asked to generate multiple ideas in response to either the MC-provoking problem
or the BC-provoking problem that were used in the pilot study. The instructions that
followed the MC-provoking problem were: “Generate as many creative ways of getting
back at that classmate as you can, remembering that you do not want your retaliation to
be discovered.” This situation was structured to be as malevolent as possible not only in
terms of the number and severity of aggressive cues it contained, but also in the
retaliatory nature of the instructions. To parallel the MC-provoking problem, the
instructions that followed the BC-provoking problem are as follows: “Generate as many
creative ways of helping your classmate as you can, remembering that you do not want
your tutoring to be obvious.” This situation was structured to be as benevolent as
possible not only in terms of the number of prosocial and cooperative cues it contained,
but also in the helpful nature of the instructions.
Measures
Implicit aggression. The CRTA is a measure of one’s implicit aggression by
way of one’s aggressive justification mechanisms, administered in the form of a 25question logic test (James, McIntyre, Glisson, Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004; James et al.,
2005). Of those, 22 questions are factored into the scoring process and 3 of the
questions are filler problems. Each question has four possible responses; two of the
responses are illogical, one response indicates a nonaggressive justification
mechanism, and another response indicates an aggressive justification mechanism. An
example problem with its four response options are as follows: “Half of all marriages
end in divorce. One reason for the large number of divorces is that getting a divorce is
quick and easy. If a couple can agree on how to split their property fairly, then they can
get a divorce simply by filling out forms and taking them to court. They do not need
lawyers. Which of the following is the most logical conclusion based on the above? (A)
People are getting older when they get married. (B) If one’s spouse hires a lawyer, then
he or she is not planning to play fair. (C) Couples might get back together if getting a
divorce took longer. (D) More men than women get divorced” (LeBreton et al., 2007).

The responses are scored such that an illogical response receives a score of 0, a
nonaggressive response receives a score of 1, and an aggressive response receives a
score of 1. Therefore, higher scores indicate greater implicit aggression. Past research
suggests that the CRTA is a reliable test of implicit aggression (KR-20 = .76) and valid
with regard to its application across various samples (Bowler, Bowler, & Cope, 2013;
James et al., 2004; LeBreton et al., 2007). The CRTA in this study had an acceptable
internal consistency (α = .67).
Premeditation. Participants completed a subscale of premeditation from a larger
measure of impulsivity (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Participants responded to the 11item scale using a Likert-type scale, 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and it
was found to have an acceptable internal consistency (α = .76). Higher scores indicate
individuals who are more deliberate thinkers and consider the consequences of their
actions. Example items include “My thinking is usually careful and purposeful” and “I
tend to value and follow a rational, ‘sensible’ approach to things.”
Ideational fluency. It is possible that participants who generate a higher number
of malevolently creative ideas in response to the problem-solving task are simply prone
to generating more ideas in general, regardless of task or problem. As such, using
ideational fluency from an independent creativity task as a control variable can ensure
that the results are based on the hypothesized relationships and are not simply an
artifact of an individual’s disposition to generate a higher number of ideas. In other
words, some people are simply better divergent thinkers, which could be a potential
confound when using a fluency-based operationalization of creativity (e.g., number of
malevolently creative ideas). Participants were therefore asked to generate multiple
consequences in response to the following nonvalenced, divergent thinking task: “What
would happen if humans no longer needed to eat or drink?” (Guilford, 1967). Ideas were
counted and summed; that total score was used as a control variable in all regression
analyses. Other common factors of creativity (e.g., originality, flexibility) were not
included as control variables because the inclusion of too many predictors could
negatively influence the stability of the results.
Ratings of dependent variables. The ideas generated in response to the
problem-solving task were rated by trained raters for valence and originality. Three
raters were trained to rate the solutions for each construct for each problem (12 raters in
total) using a modified consensual assessment technique (Amabile, 1982). Idea valence
was rated using a valence rating scale, which has been used successfully in past
studies (Harris et al., 2013). This rating scale is a Likert-type scale with 5 anchors, 1
(very negative) to 5 (very positive), and was used to assess the degree of negativity or
positivity that each idea conveyed. Idea originality was rated on a scale of 1 (very
unoriginal) to 5 (very original) and was used to assess the uniqueness of an idea
compared to all other ideas generated in response to a specific problem. An idea was
deemed negative if it had an average rating of less than a 3 on a 5-point scale, and an
idea was deemed original if it had an average rating of higher than a 3 on a 5-point

scale. All interclass correlations exceeded .70, indicating acceptable agreement
between each rater triad.
The primary dependent variable of interest for this study is the generation of
malevolently creative ideas. In this study, MC is comprised of negativity and originality,
so an idea was deemed malevolently creative if it was both negative and original. As
such, two scores (i.e., negativity and originality) were combined to create a composite,
singular score of MC. In other words, an idea was deemed to be malevolently creative if
it was both negative (i.e., less than a 3 on the valence rating scale) and original (i.e.,
greater than a 3 on the originality rating scale). For this study, MC was operationalized
in terms of the number of generated ideas that were malevolently creative.
It must be noted that all MC is negative (i.e., results in harmful or undesirable
outcomes for one or more parties), but not all negative creativity is malevolent. In other
words, to operationalize MC using negativity allows for negative outcomes that can be
harmful or undesirable, so “negative” was chosen in this study to allow for a more
inclusive set of possible ideas. This means that ideas that were not harmful, but were
still negative (i.e., undesirable), did not have to be excluded.

Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for, and correlations between, number of
malevolently creative ideas, ideational fluency (from the divergent-thinking task),
gender, problem type, implicit aggression, and premeditation. An additional correlation
was calculated between task order and number of malevolently creative ideas to
determine whether task order potentially influenced MC. Specifically, the CRTA could
make aggressive responses more available in working memory when participants
responded to the problem-solving task, and responding to the MC-provoking problem
might have artificially enhanced the degree to which participants condoned aggressive
responses in the CRTA. The correlation between task order and MC was not significant,
r(131) = -.10, p = .13, indicating that task order had no effect on MC. As such, task
order was not used as a control variable in any subsequent analyses.

Additionally, it is possible that the MC-provoking condition allowed for greater
acceptance of the generation of risky ideas, which may have inadvertently encouraged
the generation of more ideas in general (as compared to the BC-provoking condition).

Therefore, a t test was conducted to assess whether more ideas were generated in
response to the MC-provoking situation. The results indicate that no significance
difference in idea fluency existed between the conditions: MMC-Provoking = 2.93, SDMCProvoking = 1.63; MBC-Provoking = 3.06, SDBC-Provoking = 1.76; t(129) = -.46, p = .64, g* = .08.
Similar to the finding by Lee and Dow (2011), gender related to MC, r(129) = .16, p = .034. Using a t test, there was a marginally significant difference in the number
of malevolently creative ideas that males and females generated (MMale = .62, SDMale =
1.10; MFemale = .30, SDFemale = .82; t(127) = 1.85, p = .067, g* = .33). These results, like
those found by Lee and Dow (2011), indicate that males generate a higher number of
malevolently creative ideas than females. That marginally significant difference for
gender is across situational scenarios, but a difference is especially likely when context
is included. As such, t tests were calculated for gender based on problem type with
respect to their influence on MC (see Figure 1); an interaction was found between
gender and problem type. Specifically, males and females differed from one another
with respect to the number of malevolently creative ideas they generated in response to
the MC-provoking problem (MMale = 1.38, SDMale = 1.45; MFemale = .45, SDFemale = 1.03;
t(65) = 2.83, p = .006, g* = .74), but they did not differ from one another in response to
the BC-provoking problem (MMale = .15, SDMale = .37; MFemale = .08, SDFemale = .28; t(60)
= .86, p = .40, g* = .21). These results indicate that males generate a higher number of
malevolently creative ideas than females when responding to situations that provoke
MC, but no such gender difference exists when responding to situations that provoke
benevolent creativity.

The correlations shown in Table 2 offer initial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
However, because gender significantly related to MC, and to factor out propensities for
ideation, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested using hierarchical multiple regressions while
controlling for gender and ideational fluency (from the divergent-thinking task). Likewise,
to factor out variance accounted for by the problems that participants responded to,
problem type was also controlled for in these analyses. In support of Hypothesis 1,
implicit aggression significantly predicted MC while controlling for gender, ideational
fluency, and problem type, β = .27, t(128) = 3.32, p = .001, ∆R2 = .07, F(4, 124) = 9.40,
p = .001. This indicates that individuals who are more (vs. less) implicitly aggressive
generate a higher number of malevolently creative ideas. In support of Hypothesis 2,
premeditation significantly predicted MC while controlling for gender, ideational fluency,
and problem type, β = -24, t(128) = - 3.04, p = .003, ∆R2 = .06, F(4, 124) = 8.87, p <
.001. This indicates that individuals who are less (vs. more) premeditative generate a
higher number of malevolently creative ideas.
To test Hypothesis 3, a hierarchical multiple regression was calculated to
determine whether MC was influenced by a three-way interaction between problem
type, implicit aggression, and premeditation while controlling for gender and divergentthinking fluency (see Table 3). All continuous predictors (ideational fluency, implicit
aggression, and premeditation) were mean-centered and both dichotomous predictors
(gender and problem type) were effect-coded. In support of Hypothesis 3, the three-way
interaction between problem type, implicit aggression, and premeditation was significant

in predicting the number of malevolently creative ideas that were generated while
controlling for gender and ideational fluency, β = .32, t(128) = 3.60, p = .001, ∆R2 = .06,
F(9, 119) = 9.78, p = .001. That three-way interaction was probed according to the steps
outlined by Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and Richter (2006); Figure 2 shows the
results of that probing procedure. These results indicate that individuals who are more
implicitly aggressive and are less premeditative are more malevolently creative when
responding to a situation that provokes MC yet are less malevolently creative when
responding to a situation that provokes benevolent creativity.

Discussion
The effect of the interaction between problem type, implicit aggression, and
premeditation on the generation of malevolently creative ideas is indicative of a traitsituation interaction and supports the theory of trait activation (Tett & Guterman, 2000);
the problem that provoked malevolent creativity (MC) facilitated the degree to which the
traits of implicit aggression and premeditation were expressed via MC, whereas the
problem that provoked benevolent creativity (BC) inhibited that expression. Ethical
impulses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) may therefore be highly dependent not only on
individual differences such as implicit aggression and premeditation, but also on the
types of provoking situational cues (e.g., toward malevolence or benevolence) present
in the environment in which ethical decision-making is occurring. It is likely the case that
fewer aggressive situational cues are needed to activate the implicit aggression of
individuals with higher levels of implicit aggression, especially when MC is condoned. In
other words, implicitly aggressive individuals probably have a lower sensitivity threshold
with respect to the amount of provoking situational cues required to activate their implicit
aggression. That activated implicit aggression then guides subsequent behavior. In
sum, the MC-provoking problem contained several cues and indicators that could have
more easily activated the implicit aggression of individuals with higher implicit
aggression, so that kind of trait activation, when exacerbated by lower premeditation,
resulted in the generation of a higher number of malevolently creative ideas.

On the other hand, BC-provoking situations inhibited the generation of
aggressive ideas, and therefore malevolently creative ideas, regardless of an
individual’s level of implicit aggression or premeditation. There were no overtly
aggressive cues to potentially activate an individual’s implicit aggression in the BCprovoking problem, so the generation of malevolently creative ideas was significantly
dampened. It should be noted that people with lower levels of implicit aggression
probably do not have highly aggressive thoughts even when they are in situations that
provoke hostility; those people may attempt to resolve hostility in ways that are
prosocial, or at least minimally harmful. It is possible that people with low implicit
aggression do consider aggressive ideas when attempting to resolve certain problems,
but those aggressive ideas are likely dismissed and not enacted or outwardly generated
because those individuals do not condone or solve problems in aggressive ways.
As evidenced in this study, people can and do generate malevolently creative
ideas in response to situations that lack overtly aggressive cues, and other studies have
found that aggressive cues do not need to be present for implicitly aggressive
individuals to engage in aggressive behaviors (Bowler, Woehr, Bowler, Wuensch, &
McIntyre, 2011). However, in the current study, those malevolently creative responses
seem to have been fueled more by premeditation than implicit aggression. Specifically,
whether an individual’s implicit aggression is activated likely depends on one’s level of
implicit aggression and the strength or amount of provoking cues in a situation, but the
inclusion of premeditation adds a layer of complexity to that trait-situation interaction. In
particular, participants with higher levels of premeditation were the least malevolently
creative, regardless of their level of implicit aggression or the problem being responded

to (see Figure 2). This suggests that the situational activation of one trait (e.g., implicit
aggression) may be further influenced by additional traits (e.g., premeditation).
Although implicit aggression was activated in the MC-provoking problem, the
manifestation of that implicit aggression in the form of MC was dependent on one’s level
of premeditation. And regardless of the problem, lower levels of premeditation facilitated
the degree to which implicit aggression influenced MC; individuals who do not actively
anticipate the consequences of their actions may be more willing to impulsively
generate ideas that are strongly guided by their implicit aggression, which again
highlights the notion of ethical impulses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). On the other hand,
higher levels of premeditation inhibited the degree to which implicit aggression
influenced MC. Actively considering the consequences of one’s actions may override
the influence of implicit aggression, thereby subverting implicit aggression as a
prominent guide to behavior— using one’s forethought and cautiousness (i.e., higher
level of premeditation) then becomes the prominent guide to behavior. Overall, this
three-way interaction suggests that situational cues can enhance or buffer the influence
of certain traits on behavior and that influence may be further affected by additional
traits.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
This study has a number of theoretical implications. The results of this study
further explain MC with regard to situational and individual difference factors, thus
building on findings from the three other known empirical studies of MC (Harris et al.,
2013; Clark & James, 1999; Lee & Dow, 2011). Situations that provoke MC can strongly
facilitate malevolently creative responses. But depending on an individual’s cognitive
and personality-based dispositions, even contexts that lack overtly aggressive cues can
be responded to in malevolently creative ways. With that in mind, the three-way
interaction offers support for the trait-activation theory of personality (Tett & Guterman,
2000) and the hypothesis of ethical impulses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), specifically
with regard to an implicit process (i.e., implicit aggression) that relates to malevolent,
unethical behavior. That implicit process was also facilitated or inhibited by a controlled
process (i.e., premeditation), suggesting that controlled processes may override
automatic processing in certain situations.
This study also has several practical implications. Negatively valanced working
conditions can include toxic work environments, highly competitive or stressful work
environments, aggressive organizational cultures, or departments and working units
with leaders or coworkers who are hostile and abusive. Those kinds of working
conditions may facilitate MC for a variety of reasons. For example, those conditions
might promote the use of aggression by setting constrained parameters for acceptable
behavior (e.g., employees in a specific department must be unethical to maintain a
competitive edge). This may allow employees to conclude that harmful ideas, especially
harmful and original ideas, are condoned as appropriate or perhaps even necessary;
the narrow parameters for acceptable behavior could incidentally facilitate the

generation of original ways of being aggressive so employees can maintain a
competitive edge or protect themselves from anticipated threats. Another possibility is
that employees in aggressive working conditions might notice that certain unethical
behaviors (e.g., company theft, bullying, cyber-loafing) incur little to no negative
repercussions because of the ingenuity or covert nature in which those behaviors are
perpetrated. As such, those behaviors might inadvertently foster a culture of MC by way
of observational learning. Additionally, if employees engage in counterproductive work
behaviors, then originality may be requisite for success so as to reduce the possibility
that their malevolent behaviors are exposed or can be traced back to them.
Finally, aggressive working conditions could instill a strong sense of reactive
aggression or retaliatory behaviors against a perceived injustice (e.g., abusive
leadership). Perceived injustices are strong determinants of work place aggression
(Baron, Neuman, & Geddes, 1999), and covert aggression is the most prevalent form of
aggression in the work place (Baron & Neuman, 1998). This suggests that employees
who perceive an injustice might be more likely to engage in covert aggression, which in
some instances would require the use of MC. Because aggressive working conditions
might facilitate MC among employees, managers and leaders should be especially
vigilant in maintaining a prosocial work environment and framing problems in
benevolent, cooperative ways that do not encourage hostility or aggression. One
alternative could be to train and appoint “ethical hazards marshals” and committees to
consistently and appropriately assess and respond to ethical hazards in organizations
(Pendse, 2012). Finally, because higher levels of premeditation inhibit the effects of
implicit aggression on MC, businesses may want to consider training programs that
reduce impulsive types of unethical behavior via impulse control and self-regulation
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) and mindfulness (Kiken & Shook, 2011, 2012). Lower levels
of premeditation can result in negative outcomes that extend beyond MC (e.g., risky
behaviors, aggression, violence), so training employees to consider the consequences
of their actions may reduce a variety of negative behaviors. For example, self-control
can inhibit aggression (DeWall, Finkel, & Denson, 2011), and self-control training can
reduce anger and aggressive behaviors in highly aggressive individuals, even over a
period as short as two weeks (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, & Schofield, 2011).
Likewise, enhanced mindfulness may reduce maladaptive cognitions (Kiken & Shook,
2012) such as implicit aggression or lower levels of premeditation, and enhanced
emotional regulation can reduce aggressive behaviors (Calvete & Orue, 2012). In the
case of the current investigation, focusing on impulse control, empathy, and appropriate
forecasting skills could help individuals better anticipate how their behaviors might affect
others, thereby increasing the chances that MC may be viewed less favorably, or not at
all, as a viable response option to most problems (even problems that provoke
malevolence).
Limitations

This study had three primary limitations. First, the multiple hierarchical regression
that was used to test Hypothesis 4 had a low n:k ratio (about 14:1), raising potential
concerns that the coefficients are unstable, the reported effects are spurious, and that
the results may not generalize to other samples. As such, future studies will need to be
conducted to test the relationships in larger samples.
The second limitation of this study pertains to its generalizability. First, because
this study was conducted online in response to vignettes of fictional situations, it is
unknown how participants would respond to a similar situation in real life. The ways in
which people respond to fictional problems and real-life problems are not always similar,
nor are the underlying reasons always similar (Reis & Gosling, 2010). Second, the
problems in this study could be perceived as overly easy with little thought needed to
respond to them. Because the problems in this study were hypothetical, and the ideas
generated in response to those problems were anonymous and had no consequences,
participants did not have to consider the complexities of what it would mean to be
caught or have their ideas enacted in real life.
Third, the problems used in the pilot study were likely not parallel in their content.
First, the neutral condition did not include actions directed at another classmate, unlike
the MC- and BC-provoking situations. Second, the secrecy that was promoted in the
MC-provoking problem may have been substantially different from the secrecy that was
promoted in the BC-provoking problem. More explicitly, the secrecy of not wanting one’s
tutoring to be obvious may have been less severe than the secrecy involved in not
wanting one’s retaliation to be discovered. As such, future studies will need to conduct
similar assessments with problems that are more parallel in their target-based structure
and general content.
Future Research and Conclusion
The future of MC research can take many different directions. Based on the
results of the current study, future research should assess the influence of different
types, styles, and forms of aggression (e.g., instrumental, reactive, proactive, electronic,
relational) on MC. It would be especially important to determine whether there exists a
causal relationship between aggression and MC. Similarly, research should be
conducted that tests the effects of empathy, mindfulness, impulse control, selfregulation, and forecasting skills on MC, especially in highly aggressive individuals and
across different situations and contexts. With regard to personality, previous research
indicates that conscientiousness negatively relates to MC (Lee & Dow, 2011). The
results of the present research effort suggest that self-discipline and deliberation, which
are overlapping factors between premeditation and conscientiousness (e.g., Thompson,
2008; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), relate to MC. Future studies may therefore want to
parse out the specific subfactors of conscientiousness that relate to the generation and
implementation of malevolently creative ideas.

With regard to situational factors, it would be interesting to test whether certain
settings influence MC in different ways. It might be the case that individuals are more
willing to be malevolently creative in purely social situations because of perceptions of
lax or malleable standards of morality and etiquette, whereas professionalism and more
harsh repercussions may inhibit MC in organizational settings.
Based on the results of the analyses involving gender—and building on the
results of Lee and Dow (2011)—this study suggests that males are more likely to be
malevolently creative than females, especially in response to highly aggressive
situations that condone MC. As such, it may be particularly important for future studies
of MC to control for gender when conducting analyses with MC as a dependent
variable. Likewise, future research needs to better distinguish why males may be more
malevolently creative than females, and whether that distinction is consistent across all
situations. For example, it may be the case the males are more malevolently creative in
situations that require or condone the use of physical aggression, but females may be
more malevolently creative in situations that require or condone the use of verbal or
relational aggression.
MC can include spreading rumors on the playground and engaging in
counterproductive work behaviors in the office to deceiving intimate partners and
planning large-scale terrorist attacks. Considering the sheer number and variety of
applications of MC, having a better understanding of the various individual-, group-,
organizational-, and environmental-level factors that relate to MC is paramount. Harmful
behavior is often highly damaging in its own right, but harmful behavior that is also
original is a particularly dangerous combination because of the implication that such
behaviors are more difficult to detect, anticipate, and respond to. A lack of proactive and
reactive defenses against original instances of harm is concerning, especially when
considering the severity of the negative consequences that may result from such
combinations. The examination of MC is important, and this study hopefully provides a
stepping stone for researchers and practitioners to develop a better understanding of
the situational and individual factors that facilitate, condone, inhibit, or condemn the
generation and use of MC.
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Appendix
Problems Used in Pilot Study
MC-Provoking Problem
You are walking to the library when you see a classmate jogging quickly in your
direction. It’s evident that the classmate does not see you, but before you can do
anything, you two collide and both of you are knocked to the ground. You land hard on
your backpack and hear something shatter. Your classmate, who is actually a member
of your group for a class project, looks very angry at you. Your classmate quickly stands
up, does not apologize, does not offer to help you up, and mentions that everything is
your fault. As you stand up and look in your backpack, you realize that your laptop is
ruined. You want to get back at that classmate for hitting into you, being rude, and
especially for breaking your laptop, but you do not want to get caught.
BC-Provoking Problem
Over the past few weeks, you have been part of a group for a class project. All of the
members have gotten along rather well and are doing their fair share of work, but you’ve
noticed that one member in particular seems to be having difficulties learning and
understanding the material. Other members of the group have tried helping, but that
student seems rather sensitive about receiving any kind of tutoring. You want to help

your group member understand the material, but you want to do so without that member
realizing that any form of tutoring is occurring.
Neutral Problem
Over the past few weeks, you have been part of a group for a class project. You arrive
at an important meeting and realize that you forgot all of your materials for that meeting.
You want to have a productive meeting, but you do not want anyone to know that you
forgot your materials.

